PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

As MARKED BY DECIsIONs SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

BANKRUPTCY.
- The United States

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit,
decides in B. F. Roden Grocery Co. v. Bacon, 133 Fed. 515,
Proceedings that where a creditor of a bankrupt holds a
written waiver of exemptions, which is perin state
mitted by the law of the state, the court of bankCourt
ruptcy should not, on application of the bankrupt, enjoin
him from prosecuting an attachment suit -in a state court
against property claimed by the bankrupt as exempt, in any
event not longer than until the property shall have been set
aside as exempt by the trustee, the validity of the waiver
being a matter immaterial to the court of bankruptcy, and
one for the state court to determine.
The United States District Court (N. D. New York) decides In re Levey, 133 Fed. 572, that a trustee in bankruptcy

is a "party in interest" within the meaning of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and may file and
prosecute specifications of objection to the bankrupt's discharge so long as he is claiming and seeking to recover
property or money from the bankrupt alleged to belong to
the estate and to be wrongfully withheld or concealed.
Discbarge

The United States District Court (E. D. Missouri)
decides In re E. I. Arnold & Co., 133 Fed. 789, that creditors of bankrupts who advanced money to them
Gambling
Transactions on the strength of their fraudulent representations that they were earning sufficient profits to pay a stipulated weekly interest, that they were solvent and responsible
and had on hand sufficient money to pay all their depositors
the amount of their deposits, and that they did not pay dividends out of receipts, may prove up their claims in bank311

312

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

BANKRUPTCY (Continued).

ruptcy proceedings, although they knew and intehded that
the money which they advanced to the bankrupts would be
used in gambling ventures.
The United States District Court (N. D. Pennsylvania)
decides In re Lines, 133 Fed. 803, that where, after distress
Distrcss
by a landlord, the tenant is adjudicated a bankfor Rent
rupt, the necessary effect is to put the property
under the control of the bankruptcy court, which will stay
further proceedings with the distress, and require the landlord to submit his rights to that court for adjudication.
BANKS.

In Western Bank of Louisville v. Coldewey's Ex'x, 83
S. W. 629, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky decides that
Wrongful
Loans

where the president of a bank wrongfully per-

mitted his son to overdraw his account, and
thereafter the son made a deed of tnst for the benefit of
his creditors; and the bank, together with other creditors,
agreed in consideration of the conveyance to look only to
the assets so conveyed for the satisfaction of its claims
against the son, the bank was not estopped from bringing
an action against the estate of the pr,'sident for loss sustained by his breach of trust in permitting the overdrafts.

BILLS AND NOTES.

In Smith v. Willing, ioi N. W. 692, the facts were as
follows: A note was executed in Illinois on a printed form
Judgment containing a single blank after the words "pay
Note: Exec- to the order of" and followed by the word
tion In Stank

" dollars."

In this blank the words "twenty-

five, hundred" were .inserted so as to leave no space in front
of them for the name of the payee. The note contained
also a provision for confessing judgment in favor of the
holder. The attorney for the holder inserted his name by
interlining it between the words" pay to the order of" and
the words "twenty-five hundred," and thereupon took
judgment in Illinois in his favor by confession. Suit was
brought on this judgment in Wisconsin, where the Supreme
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Court held that such judgment might be attacked on the
ground that the note was not negotiable in view of the omission of the name of the payee, but was subject to any defences
that might have existed between the original parties thereto,
and there being such defences in this case the holder ought
not to have been permitted to recover. Two judges dissent. Compare Atkinson v. Foster, 134 Ill. 472.
CARRIERS.

It is held in Southern Ry. Co. v. Lockwood Mfg. Co.,
37 S. 667, that where a railway ran a car on to a siding
so that a consignee might unload the same, ihis
Lie,:
Demurrage
was not such an absolute delivery to the conCharges
signee as to preclude the carrier from later
asserting his lien on the consignment to protect himself as
to demurrage charges where Such. car was. not unloaded
within the time limit, and where under the contract of shipment the carrier was entitled to a lien for such charges.
Compare Miller v. Georgia, etc., Banking Co., 88 Ga. 563.
In Reilly v. New York City Ry. Co., 91 N. Y. Supp. 319,
it appeared that a passenger had left a street-car after being
Assault by refused change by the conductor, and later,
Servant
while waiting in the station of the defendant's
street-railway company, had spoken tb the conductor about
the matter, whereupon the conductor had assaulted him.
He then brought suit against the company, but the court
denies him a recovery on the ground that his relation to
the company as passenger had ceased and the conductor
was not acting within the scope of his authority in committing the assault. Compare Stewart v. Brooklyn and Crosstown Ry. Co., 90 N. Y. 388.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi decides in Illinois Cent.
R. Co. v. Smith, 37 S. 643, that a common carrier of pas-.
sengers may refuse transportation to a person
Refusal of
Passencger
who, on account of physical or mental disability,
is likely to require attention from the carrier or the passengers and to be unable to take care of himself, but where a
person seemingly unable to take care of himself is known
to the carrier to be, as a matter of fact, able to do so, he
cannot be refused transportation. The reasonableness or
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unreasonableness of the refusal of a passenger, it is held,
is a question of fact to be decided by the jury. Compare
Zachary v. Railroad, 75 Miss. 751, 4 L. R. A. 385.
In Lenibeck v. Jarzis Tcrminal Cold Storage Co., 59 Ati.
360, it appeared that a carrier delivered goods to a conLi n for
signee upon the promise of the consignee to
Freight:
hold then until the freight should be paid. The
Delivery
consignee, however, delivered the goods to a
third party as pledgee, such third party having no knowledge of this agreement. The Court of Chancery of New
Jersey decides that as against him the carrier had lost its
lien, delivery to the consignee being sufficient as against
all persons taking without notice to waive his lien, no matter what the secret agreement between himself and the
consignee might have been.
Compare AcFarland v..
Wheeler, 26 \Wend. 467, 474CHRISTIAN SCIENCE.

In Spead v. Ton linson, 59 At. 376, the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire deals with a suit brought to. recover
Liabilityfor
Negligence

damages for unsuccessful treatment by one

professing to be a Christian Science healer. The
court, holding that standard of care by which such person is to be judged is the care, skill, and knowledge of an
ordinary Christian Science healer and not that of an ordinary physician, decides that where a person has intelligently
and voluntarily consented to follow the advice and abide
by the result of the prayers of a Christian Science healer
he -cannot later recover damages for negligence based on
the ground that public policy is opposed to such treatment.
Compare Goodyear v. Brown, 155 Pa. 903, 20 L. R. A.

838.
CONSTITUTION.

In Norfolk and W. Ry. Co. v. Cheatwood's Adrn'x, 49
S. E. 489, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia deConsideration
of Provision

cides that where a constitutional provision of
one state is incorporated in the constitution

of inother, the construction placed upon the provision by
the courts of the former state before its adoption in the
latter must be adopted by the courts of the latter state.
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CONVERSION.

Where plaintiff had delivered to defendant a case containing merchandise to be transported by it, and defendant
failed to deliver the goods and when asked for
Loss by
Carrier
the return of the same claimed they had been
lost, there is no conversion of such goods: New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, in Goldbowitz v. M etropolitan Express Co., 91 N. Y. Supp. 318. With this decision compare Rubin v. Wells, Fargo Ex. Co., 85 N. Y.
Supp. iio8.

CORPORATIONS.

It is decided by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Term, in Harrisv. Vienna Ice-Cream Co., 91 N. Y. Supp.
Employment 317, that where the president and secretary of
of Physicians a corporation had requested a physician to render professional services to two employees of the corporation, the corporation was not liable therefor in the absence
of a showing that the services rendered were for the benefit of the corporation or in satisfaction of a claim, if any
there might be against it. "Persons dealing with the officers of a corporation or with persons assuming to represent
it are chargeable with notice of the purposes of its creation
and its powers and with the authority, actual or apparent,
of its officers or agents with whom they deal." Wilson v.
Kings County El. R. R. Co., 114 N. Y. 467.
Intercorporate relations are constantly giving rise to perplexing questions, one of which appears in the. decision of
Voting Own the Court of Chancery of New Jersey in O'ConStock
nor v. InternationalSilver Co., 59 Adt. 321.
The statute of New Jersey forbids the stock of a corporation belonging to itself to be voted on. It is held in the
case referred to that this prevents the directors of a corporation from voting stock of the corporation owned by another corporation of which the corporation in question has
purchased all the capital stock. Compare American Railway Frog Co. v. Haven, IOI MasS. 398.
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CRIMES.

In re Stubbs, 133 Fed. 1012, the United States Circuit
Court (D. Washington, W. D.) decides that where a
United States soldier killed a fellow-soldier
Acquittal
during a military encampment, and on being
surrendered to the civil authorities of the state was prosecuted for murder and acquitted, such acquittal, though a
final determination of his innocence of murder and of each
lesser offence necessarily included therein, was no bar to
his subsequent military arrest and trial by a general courtmartial for "conduct to the prejudice of good order and
military discipline," in violation of the sixty-second article
of war, though such court-martial was based on the same
act. Compare Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U. S. 139.
EVIDENCE.

In Stout v. Sands, 49 S. E. 428, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia decides that suppression by one
party to a suit of a document relied upon as
Suppression:
Presumptions evidence by the opposite party is not equivalent to an admission oi the truth of the claim of the
latter respecting its contents, and does not dispense with
the necessity of prima-facie proof of such claim sufficient
to sustain a judgment or decree. But when a primafacie case is made, and doubt is cast upon it by rebuttal evidence or otherwise, suppression of the document
raises a strong inference against the party failing to produce
it and determines the point in favor of the other party. It
is furthe," held +hat though a party cannot impeach a witness
called by him, he is not bound by all such witness says. He
may.prove the material facts by other evidence, even though
the effect of it is to directly contradict his own witness, but
he cannot show that the witness has made contradictory
statements out of court. Compare "Wheelihg v. Hawley,
18 W. Va. 472FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.

The question as to what constitutes " doing. business"
within the .meaning of the state statutes imposing restrictions or creating conditions on foreign corpoBusiness
rations doing business within their boundaries
withl.uthe
is an interesting one, and one upon which the
State
cases do not seem to have established a very broad and
comprehensive basis on which the law may be developed.
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This question is raised in the case of American Contractor
Pub. Co. v. Bagge, 9i N. Y. Supp. 73- In that case a
foreign corporation engaged in publishing a magazine in
Illinois employed an agent in New York to solicit orders
for advertisements. These orders were forwarded to Illinois for acceptance, and, if accepted, the advertisements
appeared in the magazine. The New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Term, holds that this does not constitute a "doing
business" within the meaning of the New York laws requiring foreign corporations doing business in New York
to obtain a certificate and pay a license tax. Compare
Jones v. Keeler, 81 N. Y. Supp. 648.

FREIGHT RATES.

The Supreme Court of Texas decides in Texas and P.
Ry. Co. v. Mugg & Driden, 83 S. V. 8oo, that where cerrlsrepresentain shippers contracted for the sale of coal at
tatlons
a certain price, basing their price on the representations of the carrier's agent that the freight would be
as stated by him, and, nevertheless, were compelled to pay
a higher rate, the carrier is liable for damages occasioned
by such misrepresentations notwithstanding the fact that
the agent named a rate less than the rate posted in accordance with the interstate commerce law. Compare PondDecker Lumber Co. v. Spencer, 86 Fed. 846.

GAMBLING.

In New York the liquor tax law prohibits gambling on
the premises occupied by a pharmacist authorized to sell
Slot
liquor. In Cullinan v. Hosmer, 91 N. Y. Supp.
Machines
6o7, the question arises whether a slot-machine
in a drug-store, which was so arranged that a person who
dropped five cents into it became entitled to at least one
cigar, and possibly to three, said cigars being sold at five
cents each, constituted gambling. The New York Supreme
Court (Appellate Division, Fourth Department), with one
judge dissenting, decides that it is not a form of gambling.
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It is held by the Suprer. e Court of Arkansas in State v.
Mallory, 83 S. XV. 955, that the state's ownership of fish
State
and game is not such a proprietary'interest as
Ownership
will authorize a sale thereof or the granting of
special interest therein or license to enjoy, but is solely for
the purposes of regulation and preservation for the common use, and is not inconsistent with a claim of individual
or special ownership by the owner of the soil if it be found
that there can be any such individual or special ownership.
It is therefore decided that an act of the state purporting
to protect the game and fish of the state and declaring it
unlawful for any non-resident to game or fish at any season
constitutes a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against denying the equal protection of the law in so far
as it prevents the same enjoyment of his property right by
a non-resident landowner as is afforded a resident landowner. It is further held that the taking away of such right
as a non-resident is without due process of law. Two judges
dissent. Compare Geer v. Cont., I61 U. S. 519.
INSURANCE.

In Donley v. Glenn's Falls Ins Co., 91 N. Y. Supp. 302,
the New York Supreniie Court (Appellate Division, Fourth
Breach of
Department) decides, against the dissent of two
Warranty
judges, that where there is a breach of the
usual warranty as to the title of land on which the insured
building is located, such breach does not avoid the policy
as to personalty which is situated in the building. The
prevailing and dissenting opinions present a very satisfactory review of the decisions and of the questions involved.
Compare Pratt v. Dwelling House Mit. Fire Ins. Co., i30
N. Y. 206.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

In Eschniann v. Atkinson, 91 N. Y. Supp. 319, it is decided by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term,
Constructive

that the refusal on the part of the owner of an

Eviction
apartment to permit a colored servant to use
the'elevator in the apartment constituted a constructive
eviction of the master of such servant under the facts of
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that case, there not being sufficient evidence in the mind
of the court to bring home to the defendant the existence
of a rule that such servants should be excluded from the
building. Compare Doyle v. Lord, 64 N. Y. 432.
LIMITATIONS.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina decides in Devine
v. Miller,49 S. E. 479, that an administrator by his promise
in writing may renew a note of his intestate
Promise of
Adminis.
before it is barred so as to bind the personalty,
but the real estate can only be affected by the
trator
promise of an heir to the extent of his interest. Compare
Bolt v. Dawkins, 16 S. C. 211.
LOCAL ACT.

In Commonwealth ex rel Miller & Sons v. Brown, 59
At]. 479, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, althorgh
recognizing the general rule that a local act is
Repeal:
GeOern llaw

not regarded as repealed by a general act on

the same subject with inconsistent provisions, unless a contrary intent is clearly apparent, decides, however, that where
a general act is passed to carry into effect a general mandatory provision of the state constitutions all acts inconsistent therewith, including local acts, are thereby repealed.
Compare Commonwealth v. Summerville, 204 Pa. 3oo.
MORTGAGES.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, holding that although ordinarily the burden of proving the payment of a
For upport: mortgage indebtedness is on the mortgagor,
Possession

decides in David v. Poland, 59 Atl. 520, that

it is otherwise in the case of a mortgage given for the support of the mortgagee where it is provided in the-mortgage
that the support shall be furnished the mortgagee upon the
premises described in the mortgage. In such a case the
implication is clear that it was the intention of the parties
that the mortgagor should retain possession of the premises
until a breach of the condition, because possession by him is
absolutely necessary in order to enable him to perform the
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condition of the mortgage. In such a case the burden of
proving that there has been a breach of the condition of
the mortgage is upon the mortgagee or upon an assignee
who seeks to recover possession of the premises. With
this decision compare Hadley v. Hadley, 8o Me. 459It is decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia in Liskey v. Snyder, 49 S. E. 515, that a purPurchaseat chase of real estate at a judicial sale by
JudicialSale

strangers to the proceeding, and contempora-

neous resale thereof by them to the debtor by an executory contract in writing, whereby he is charged with a
certain sum -in addition to the amount for which it sold
at the judicial sale, all in pursuance of a prior verbal contract, though in form a purchase of the land, is regarded
in equity as a loan of money on the land as security, and
the rights of the parties are determined by the principles
governing the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee.
NEGLIGENCE.

The tendency of the courts to create rules of law as to
what does or does not constitute negligence in accident
cases is continually appearing in the decisions.
Pesenger
oanRun-ingBoard

An illustration of this occurs in Rosen v. Dry
Dock, E. B. and B. 1?. Co., 91 N. Y. Supp.

333, where it is decided as a matter of law that a person
who, because a car is crowded, stands on the runningboard is guilty of contributory negligence, .where he was
injured by being struck by the shaft of a wagon, which
other passengers had avoided by keeping close to the car
or getting between the seats. It seems to be regarded as
settled that where a passenger can find room to stand between the seats, even though these run latitudinally, it is
negligent for him to ride on the running-board.
Decisions have frequently questioned the logical propriety of drawing a distinction between the so-called degrees
of negligence, and the criticism upon such disGross
Negligence

tinction seems to be entitled to respect

In

Rideout v. Winnebago Traction Co., IOI N. W. 672, the
court lays down certain distinctions which may perhaps be
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of service in connection with the cases on this question.
The term "negligence," it is said, by itself suggests only
inadvertence or want of ordinary care, and however great
may be the degree of such want of care, so long as the inadvertence remains, wilfulness is excluded. On the other
hand, the court says the term "gross negligence" signifies
wilfulness. It involves intent, actual or constructive, which
is a characteristic of criminal liability. Gross negligence
does not include ordinary negligence, and proof of the former does not prove, but rather disproves, the latter. In
connection with this decision compare Cleveland, etc., R.
W. Co. v. Miller, 149 Ind. 490, 501.

OYSTERS.

In Vroom v. Tilly, 91 N. Y. Supp. 51, the Supreme Court.
(Appellate Division, Second Department) decides that it is
Oyster Beds: not necessary that a person who alleges ownerOwnership ship in certain oyster-beds should own the land
on which they are situated, and the fact that he has been
a trespasser at such place does not entitle the owner of
the land as against him to take them for his own use,
although he may compel the person who planted them to
take them up, or although he might himself remove them
as a nuisance. One judge dissents and the case is an interesting discussion of the point involved in view of the rather
few decisions on this subject. Compare Supter v. VanDerbeer, 47 Hun. 366.

PHOTOGRAPHS.

In Barb v. Oxford Paper Co., 59 Atl. 29 o , the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine decides that photographs, *to be
Admissibility admissible as evidence, should simply show conditions existing at the time in question. When
taken with men in various assumed postures, and things in
various assumed situations, in order to illustrate the claims
and contentions of the parties, they should not be admitted.
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RAILROADS.

Several decisions have recently appeared as to the right
of a public service corporation to condemn corporate stock.
An "mportant decision is handed down by the
Condemna.
tion of stock Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in New

of otherRoads

York, N. H. and H. R. Co. v. Offield, 59 Atl.

5io, relating to this question. A law of Connecticut authorizes a railroad company which has acquired more than threefourths of the stock of another railroad company and cannot agree with the holders of the outstanding stock for the
purchase thereof, to condemn such stock on a finding that
it would be for the public interest. It is held that such statute is constitutional, and that it is for the public interest
that a railroad company should condemn the few shares of
outstanding stock where it is contemplating extensive improvements and desires to use the credit of the road whose
stock it wishes to condemn to raise funds for the improvements, it itself not possessing the credit necessary.. Compare
Black v. Delawareand R. C. Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 130.

TAXES.

In Penobscot Chemical Fibre Co. v. Inhabitants of Town
of Bradley, 59 At. 83, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
Assessment:
Valuation

decides that the value, as distinguished from

valuation, of other similar property in the town
similarly situated, as shown by the evidence of actual sales,
or by the opinion of properly qualified witnesses, expressed
in court, is admissible upon the question of true value. Compare Manchester Mills v. Manchester, 57 N. H. 3o9.

TOWNS.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. laying down the
general rule that in maintaining a police lock-up a town is
Liabilities

pursuing, not a municipal purpose, but a public

purpose, viz., the maintenance of the justice
and peace of the state; and hence, in the absence of any
statute imposing liability, the town is not liable for neglect
of its selectmen in the care of it, holds in Mains v. Inhabitants of Ft.Fairfield,59 Atl. 87, that the fact that a prisoner
committed by a constable to a town lock-up suffered damage
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from its neglected condition does not make the town liable
to an action therefor.
WATER-COURSES.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia decides
in Uhl v. Ohio River R. Co., 49 S. E. 378, that overflow
waters of a natural stream in times of ordinary
Overflow
flood or freshet flowing over or standing upon
the adjacent lowlands do not cease to be part of the stream,
unless and until separated therefrom so as to prevent their
return to its channel.
WILLS.

The Prerogative Court of New Jersey decides In re Middleton's Will, 59 Atl. 454, that without proof that a misUndue
tress influenced a testator directly in procuring
Influence
a will in her favor, it cannot be inferred from
their relation that she secured an influence over him which
she would naturally and improperly exert to advance her
interest. Compare Arnault v. Arnault, 52 N. J. Eq. 8oi.
The statutory law of Wisconsin, like the statutory law
of many other states, provides that a child born after the
After-Born
making of his parent's will, for whom no proChildren
vision is made in the will, shall share in the
estate as if the parent had died intestate, unless it appears
from the will that the parent intended to make no provision for such child. Another statutory provision is to
the effect that where children are adopted by legal proceedings, children so adopted shall be deemed, for the pur-.
poses of inheritance and all other legal purposes, the same
as if they had been born in lawful wedlock. Construing
these provisions, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decides
It re Sandon's Will, IO N. W. IO89, that where a child
had been legally adopted after her adoptive father had
made his will she was entitled to share in her father's estate
as if he had died intestate, where no mention of her or
provision for her was made in his will. The court holds
that for the purposes of these provisions the date of adoption of an adopted child is equivalent to the date of the
birth of a parent's own child, nor can evidence be received
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to show that he intended to make no mention of such child
unless the will is ambiguous or doubtful on its face. Compare Bresee v. Stilcs, 22 Wis. 120.
In Bush v. Whitaker, 91 N. Y. Supp. 616, it appeared
that an uncle wrote to his nephew, telling him that if there
Agreement

to Bequeath:
Specific Per-

were- no change in his family he would will
him one-half of his property, and then went
on to say, "You get me up a cane that will be

good enough for you when I get through with
it, and I will leave you the cane and one thousand dollars
with it." The nephew secured a cane for his uncle, which the
latter accepted and used for many years, but failed to leave
the one thousand dollars to his nephew, bequeathing substantially all his property to an adopted daughter. The
court holds that the nephew is entitled to specific performance of the contract. Compare Ozuens v. McNally, 113 Cal.
444, 33 L. R. A. 369, where an unmarried man contracted
to give all his property to his niece if she would take care
of hm. Later he married and died without performing his
agreement. The court efuses to enforce the contract on
the ground that the rights of an innocent third party had
intervened and hardship would result to the widow.
formance

